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Abstract. Ontology has been traditionally guided by sophia, a form of knowledge directed
toward that which is eternal, permanent, necessary. This tradition finds an important early
expression in the philosophical ontology of Aristotle. Yet in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristo-
tle’s intense concern to do justice to the world of finite contingency leads him to develop a
mode of knowledge, phron—sis, that implicitly challenges the hegemony of sophia and the
economy of values on which it depends.  Following in the tradition of the early Heidegger’s
recognition of the ontological significance of Aristotle’s Ethics and of Gadamer’s appropria-
tion of phron—sis for hermeneutics, this article argues that an ontology guided by phron—sis is
preferable to one governed by sophia.  Specifically, it suggests that by taking sophia as its
paradigm, traditional philosophical ontology has historically been determined by a kind of
knowledge that is incapable of critically considering the concrete historico-ethico-political
conditions of its own deployment.  This critique of sophia is accomplished by uncovering
the economy of values that led Aristotle to privilege sophia over phron—sis.  It is intended to
open up the possibility of developing an ontology of finite contingency based on phron—sis.
Such an ontology, because it is guided by and must remain responsible to the concrete indi-
vidual with which it is engaged, would be ethical at its very core.
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In his influential lectures on Plato’s Sophist, Martin Heidegger suggests that
the Greek understanding of the meaning of being was oriented by a deep ad-
miration for the eternal that accounts for the privileged position sophia occu-
pies in ancient Greek thinking.1  However, in the account of the Nicomachean
Ethics that opens these lectures, Heidegger also suggests that the notion of
phron—sis Aristotle develops in book VI is structurally quite similar to sophia
and thus that it emerges as a genuine rival to sophia as the highest possibility
of Dasein. Heidegger himself seems to have drawn heavily on Aristotle’s
conception of phron—sis in Sein und Zeit, although it is a matter of some de-
bate as to precisely which elements of the “fundamental ontology” developed
there owe their inspiration to phron—sis.2  By the end of his analysis of Aristo-
tle in the Sophist lectures, however, Heidegger too seems to endorse the pri-
ority of sophia over phron—sis precisely because it employs nous which
provides the proper access to the disclosing of truth (alethes).3  What Heidegger
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fails to address, and what his endorsement of the priority of sophia prevents
him from critically considering, is the economy of values that has historically
determined the decision to give pride of place to sophia and nous. Once the
normative assumptions implicit in such a decisive decision are delineated,
phron—sis, because it points to the possibility of developing a critically self-
reflective model of ontological knowledge firmly embedded in the finite world,
emerges as a genuine alternative to sophia.
Traditional ontology has embraced an economy of values that privileges
the eternal, universal and necessary over the finite and contingent. This
economy operates already in the Parmenidean response to Heraclitus and in
the Platonic obsession with the imperishable. Yet it is Aristotle who consoli-
dates it by establishing the study of being qua being as “first philosophy”
thereby directing ontology towards a first, eternal, universal and necessary
principle (Meta., 1026a24–34).4  Such a directive already operates with an
economy of values it is itself loath to recognize, choosing instead to hide
behind the aura of authority theory is said to hold over practice. But ontology
has never been merely theoretical; it is always born out of and determined by
the historico-ethico-political conditions under which it is developed. Indeed,
blinded by its love for sophia and a concomitant passion for eternal certainty,
ontology has historically been reluctant to recognize the concrete conditions
of its own birth. In this sense, ontology has for too long been perverted by
philosophy.
However, if, with his insistence on the necessary and certain, Aristotle
decisively determines the importance of philosophy for ontology, with the
dialectical method he uses in developing his thinking in relation to the his-
tory of his predecessors, and, more notably, with the introduction of phron—sis,
a form of knowledge capable of critically considering the conditions of its own
operation, Aristotle also offers ontology the tools by which to extricate itself
from the hegemony of sophia. The significance of the dialectical method
Aristotle deploys against his predecessors cannot be over-emphasized, for it
establishes him as the first historian of philosophy to explicitly think with and
against the tradition in which he is embedded. However, it remains of second-
ary importance for the present attempt to delineate the extent to which Aristotle
both inaugurates and undermines the trajectory of the history of philosophical
ontology. The dialectical method remains inadequate in this regard because
when deployed, as it is in Physics, book I and Metaphysics, A and B, it is far
more concise and explicit about what is to be rejected of the inherited think-
ing than what is uncritically accepted. The tendency to value the necessary
and eternal over the contingent and finite is an inherited assumption Aristotle
never considers calling into question, at least not until, in the Nicomachean
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Ethics, he turns his attention to the contingent existence of human being. There
Aristotle develops the notion of phron—sis over against that of sophia precisely
because sophia would not deign to work with the dynamic, contingent prin-
ciples endemic to ethics. Yet even here, Aristotle remains intent on ultimately
subordinating phron—sis to sophia. So long as the economy of values under-
lying this condescending attitude towards contingency remains unchallenged,
sophia will retain a dangerous aura of authority, operating with a set of nor-
mative ideals it is constitutionally incapable of critically considering.
Therefore, in what follows, I will first adumbrate the economy of values
underlying Aristotle’s argument for the preeminence of sophia in order to ex-
pose the limitations of philosophical ontology. Second, I will argue that Aristo-
tle’s conception of phron—sis has an advantage over sophia because it is capable
of critically considering the concrete conditions under which it operates. Finally,
I will suggest that an ontology directed by phron—sis is preferable to one gov-
erned by sophia precisely because the logic of phron—sis includes the con-
ceptual apparatus that enables ontology to remain critically cognizant of the
conditions under which it is deployed.5
1. Philosophical ideals
A preliminary indication of the ideals that inform Aristotle’s conception of
sophia can be gained if we attend to its six basic aspects as developed in
Metaphysics A.2, where he considers common beliefs about the subject.  The
wise person is thought (1) to be able to know all things (panta) without need-
ing to know each thing individually; (2) to know things difficult to know; (3)
to be more accurate; (4) to be more capable of teaching the causes; (5) to pursue
knowledge for its own sake; and (6) to set the order rather than being set in
order. Aristotle himself ties all six aspects together under the heading “uni-
versal knowledge” (t—n katholou epist—m—n) (982a22–3). Denise Schaeffer
has recognized the significance of this designation, suggesting that, with the
important exception of the aspect of teaching, “all of these attributes have to
do with abstracting from particulars.”6  However, based on what Aristotle ac-
tually says in Metaphysics A.1–2, it is difficult to see how teaching too does not
succumb to this basic characterization.
Aristotle explicitly states that the ability to teach is a sign of the one who
understands (tou eidotos) and involves stating the causes of each thing (981b7–
982a30). Further, he links the dimension of teaching closely to that of accu-
racy. According to the Posterior Analytics, a science is more accurate if it (1)
knows not only the facts, but the reasons for the facts; (2) is not concerned
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with the underlying subject; and (3) has fewer principles (87a33–39). Only
the first of these aspects of accuracy suggests even the possibility that attend-
ing to concrete individuals is important, and it recognizes this reluctantly,
immediately eclipsing it by emphasizing the importance of reasons. Thus,
according to Aristotle, what seems to make the wise person more capable of
teaching is not, as Schaeffer would have it, the self-reflective ability to repro-
duce knowledge in the student, but rather, the simple ability to see and accu-
rately state the causes.7
Therefore, the dimension of teaching seems also to fit into the basic charac-
terization of sophia as a kind of universal knowledge that need not concern it-
self with the concrete individual. Although Aristotle has a rich understanding
of the various ways in which the term “universal” is employed, here it seems
that sophia is “universal” not because it is knowledge of the highest genus, nor
because it knows the forms appearing in each individual being, but rather be-
cause it knows the first causes of all things and therefore can determine that which
is essential to each individual without needing to attend to each on every occa-
sion.8  Thus, sophia will be a universal knowledge regardless of whether the
principles and causes it knows are themselves universal or individual.
So, if we take the first aspect Aristotle presents in this preliminary discus-
sion of sophia seriously, namely, that the wise person knows all things (panta)
without having knowledge of each individually, then a totalizing tendency seems
to emerge as part of the basic operation of sophia. When seen in conjunction
with the last aspect mentioned, namely that the wise person sets the order, the
totalizing tendency takes on a distinctively authoritarian flavor – for in Aristo-
tle, as Joseph Owens rightly suggests, sophia, although not itself a practical
science, regulates the order of human activity.9  The concern to secure order by
obedience to those with direct access to the eternal principles guides Aristotle’s
thinking about sophia throughout; it is evident here in this preliminary analy-
sis and it informs his constant insistence on the preeminence of sophia in the
Nicomachean Ethics.
1.1. The elevation of sophia
Aristotle’s brief delineation of the superiority of sophia in Nicomachean Ethics
VI (1145a7–12) reaches its highest expression in book X.7-9 where the
authoritarian tendency suggested above clearly determines Aristotle’s
thematization of the vita contemplativa as the best because it is (1) the “most
continuous,” (2) the most “self-sufficient,” and finally, (3) pursued “for the
sake of itself.”
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In NE VI.7, Aristotle elevates sophia above both epist—m— and phron—sis.
Like epist—m—, sophia is concerned with beings that are “always the same”
(1141a24–5).10  However, sophia is more than mere epist—m— precisely because
it is capable of directly intuiting the truth of the principles with which it op-
erates:
. . . it is necessary for the wise person not only to know the things that fol-
low from the principles, but also to have the truth concerning the princi-
ples, with the result that sophia would be nous and
epist—m—, that is epist—m— of the most honorable things, holding its own
head (NE 1141a16–20).11
The superiority of sophia lies in its ability to transcend the world of transient
finitude by means of nous which gives it direct, immediate and infallible ac-
cess to that which cannot vary (1141a1–9). Despite the fact that Aristotle is a
great champion of the Heraclitean maxim that “there are gods here too,” there
remains in him a deep Parmenidean bias, fostered of course, by the strong and
lasting influence of Plato, that drives him to give pride of place to that which
is eternal, permanent and infallible. The tension between these two tenden-
cies in Aristotle can be felt each time he considers the relationship between
sophia and phron—sis in book VI; for although phron—sis becomes increas-
ingly important as the Ethics progresses, it is never permitted to trump the he-
gemony of sophia. Ultimately, the preeminent status of sophia is secured by
nous with its privileged access to the eternal and concomitant infallibility.12
Yet, there is a price sophia pays for its direct access to the divine. In concen-
trating its gaze on the eternal, sophia, although always already embedded in
the world of human affairs, turns a blind eye to the real historico-ethico-po-
litical conditions to which it must be subjected as a human form of knowledge.
The ultimate expression of this sort of philosophical dismissal of concrete
human existence in the NE can be found in book X.7–9. A brief investigation
into the sorts of characteristics Aristotle praises in his attempt to establish the
priority of the theoretical over the practical activity will indicate the extent to
which this economy of philosophical values is at work.
1.2. The priority of contemplation
It should come as no surprise that Aristotle begins his discussion of the su-
premacy of the life of contemplation by asserting the preeminence of nous.
Nous is the “best” for two reasons, first because it is the best “in us” and sec-
ond because it is concerned with the best of the things known (1177a20–22).
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This appeal to the central importance of nous not only situates the discussion
of the life of contemplation firmly within the Eleatic tradition of Greek think-
ing, but also implicitly links the priority of the contemplative life to the prior-
ity of sophia.
Aristotle goes on to praise the life of contemplation as the “most continu-
ous” (synechestat—); “for,” he continues, “we are able to theorize more continu-
ally (synech—s mallon) than we are able to perform some action” (1177a21–23).
The Greek adjective “synech—s,” which literally means “keeping or holding
together,” points already to a temporal determination of contemplation inso-
far as it can mean “continuous, unceasing, and unintermitting.”13
The specifically temporal sense of the term can be traced back to Par-
menides, when, having traveled far from the “backward-turning” paths of
mortals (6.9), he attends to the goddess as she describes true Being as that
which “never was nor will be, since it is now, all of it is together one, con-
tinuous (syneches)” (8.5).14  Aristotle himself affirms the temporal determi-
nation of that which is continuous when he ascribes it to the life of God in
Metaphysics Λ.7 (1072b29), and again in Λ.9, when he argues that “if God
were not thinking but a potency, then it is reasonable that the continuity of his
thinking would be wearisome for Him” (1074b28–9). Here continuity seems
to be a function of the extent to which potentiality is annihilated; for God’s
capacity to maintain Himself in perfect continuity depends upon the total
expurgation of potency. Thus, by grounding the preeminence of contempla-
tion in its capacity for continuity, Aristotle not only privileges the eternal over
the temporal, he also implicitly endorses the rejection of potentiality. The
result, however, is that each time sophia turns its attention to that which is
contingent and therefore intimately wrapped up in the potentiality endemic
to finite time, it perverts itself, sullying the purity of its authoritative certainty.
By holding up continuity as an ideal towards which all contemplation should
aspire, Aristotle necessarily degrades any kind of thinking concerned to criti-
cally consider the contingent conditions under which it is deployed.
This capacity for self-critique is further undermined by a second charac-
teristic of the life of contemplation. Aristotle writes: “That which is called self-
sufficient (autarkeia) also would apply most of all to the theoretical activity”
(1177a27–8). Whether he uses cognates of the verb ch¸rizein (to separate) as
he does in the Metaphysics (1029a25),15  or the language of predication as he
does in the Categories (2a11–2),16  independence has always been a primary
feature of those beings in Aristotle’s ontology with the highest status. It is no
surprise, then, to find Aristotle presenting self-sufficiency as a primary charac-
teristic of the vita contemplativa. Self-sufficiency is precisely what situates
the wise person above the just. He continues:
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The wise person, the just person and all the rest have need of the necessi-
ties of life, but when they have been sufficiently furnished with things of
this sort, while the just person needs those towards whom and with whom
he will act justly, . . . the wise person on the other hand is able to theorize
even when alone, and the wiser the person is, the more that person can do
this. Although having colleagues is perhaps better, just the same he is the
most self-sufficient (1177a27–34).
Despite the equivocation of the last sentence, the familiar normative calcu-
lus is at work throughout this passage: the more self-sufficient a person is,
the higher that person is situated in the hierarchy. The just person is situ-
ated below the wise person because it is impossible to act justly without the
existence of an other with whom to act. This dependence upon others is
clearly thematized as a deficit. The deprecation of interdependence and
excessive glorification of independence comprises one of the most funda-
mental underlying normative assumptions of the philosophical ideal. It re-
veals the fundamentally monological nature of sophia.
However, in the NE Aristotle constantly struggles with this normative assump-
tion because he recognizes that being with others is a basic fact of human exist-
ence, neither to be denied nor unequivocally rejected. At the beginning of the
NE, Aristotle had attempted to clarify his own use of “autarkeia” over against
what seems to have been the common Greek (and Platonic) understanding of
the term: “For the perfect good seems to be self-sufficient. But we do not call
the human being by himself alone, living a solitary life, ‘self-sufficient,’ but also
the human being living a life with parents, children and a wife and, in general,
with friends and citizens, since human being is by nature political” (1097b7–
11). This conception of autarkeia coincides well with Aristotle’s tendency to
affirm the importance of being with others when discussing the nature of hu-
man existence. We may call this “ethical autarky” in order to distinguish it from
the “philosophical autarky” that connotes the ideal of the absolute self-suffi-
ciency of those beings that cannot be otherwise.
Because ethics is by nature concerned with the being of human beings, it is
natural to find Aristotle affirming the importance of ethical autarky at the be-
ginning of the Ethics. By the end, however, when Aristotle comes to determine
which activity is the best, he allows himself to be guided by the authority of
philosophical autarky. Thus, although the equivocation that appears at the at the
end of the passage cited above – “although having colleagues is perhaps bet-
ter” – suggests that he recognizes that insofar as sophia is a human activity, it
must be embedded in the world of inter-human relations, Aristotle remains
nonetheless explicitly loyal to that tradition of Greek thinking which privileges
eternal self-sufficiency over embedded finite interdependence.
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The third characteristic of the vita contemplativa to be mentioned in this
context is the notion that this life is sought for the sake of itself. Aristotle says
that “it is commonly thought that this activity alone is loved for the sake of
itself; for nothing is generated from it besides contemplation, but from prac-
tical activities, we gain for our own benefit (peripoioumetha) either more or
less besides the action” (1177b1–4). Here the priority of theory over practice
is based on a very instrumental interpretation of action, for Aristotle seems to
assume here, as he does not elsewhere (cf. Meta. 1048b17–37; NE 1140b4–
8), that praxis is a sort of poi—sis and thus always done for some external end.
Although it would be unjust to blame Aristotle exclusively for the radical
distinction between theory and practice that emerges most acutely after Kant,
sentences such as these in the context of his profound affirmation of the no-
bility of the divine over the human, help to facilitate the reified disjunction
between theory and practice we have inherited. Here the disjunction is estab-
lished by means of an utilitarian conception of practice that serves to further
remove theory from the concrete conditions under which it operates. The dis-
tinction between theory and practice seems designed to elevate theory above
the utilitarian perversions of contingent human existence.
However, this “poetic” interpretation eclipses another, more profound un-
derstanding of the practical in Aristotle, one that is capable of bridging the
gap between theory and practice without reducing theory to mere utilitarian
calculation. It is for the sake of this non-poetic conception of praxis that Aris-
totle develops phron—sis, a kind of knowledge capable of critically addressing
the concrete conditions of its own operation. Before turning to this conception
of phron—sis, let us summarize our analysis to this point.
What emerges here is a conception of sophia determined by an economy
of values it is constitutionally incapable of criticizing. This incapacity results
from a monological obsession with that which cannot be otherwise. The ab-
solute hegemony of sophia depends upon a decisive rejection of the concrete
contingency of human existence to which it is unavoidably bound. So long as
philosophy remains a human pursuit, any renunciation of this relationship is
dangerously delusional. As is clear from this analysis of Aristotle, historically,
sophia has wrapped itself in a shroud of nobility precisely in order to seques-
ter itself from the sullying influence of its own contingency. The aura of this
nobility has so captivated ontology that it has taken up these philosophical
ideals as its own and come to understand itself as nothing more than the as-
siduous search for the eternal truth according to which the totality of beings
may be determined. By exposing the normative assumptions that drive Aris-
totle to elevate sophia to a position of preeminence, I intend to undermine the
mesmerizing effect the aura of sophia has had on ontology in order to explic-
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itly recover for ontology the capacity for critique. This is the main impetus
behind the ontological reappropriation of phron—sis that follows.
2. Reappropriating phron—sis
Obviously, to suggest that phron—sis has ontological significance is by no
means original. We have already mentioned Heidegger’s recognition that
Aristotle’s analysis of phron—sis has far reaching ontological implications. This
direction of investigation was taken up and expanded upon by Gadamer’s
appropriation of phron—sis as a model for hermeneutics in Wahrheit und
Methode.17  However, Heidegger never explicitly thematizes a positive rela-
tionship between ethics and ontology, nor does he really question the ultimate
priority of sophia and theoretical nous. Gadamer, although he recognizes and
embraces the specifically ethical implications of his appropriation of phron—sis,
focuses primarily on the important difference between it and techn—. Here, on
the other hand, I would like to re-appropriate Aristotle’s conception of phron—-
sis for ontology in order not only to explicitly embrace the assumption im-
plied by such a strategy – namely, that ethics and ontology are, and have always
been, intertwined – but also to suggest that Aristotle’s conception of phron—sis
offers ontology the conceptual apparatus for critique sophia neither requires
nor desires. For this, a complete analysis of phron—sis is unnecessary; rather,
I will focus specifically on those dimensions of phron—sis that can be deployed
against two basic features of sophia suggested by the above analysis: (1) its
attempt to transcend its own embedded contingency by looking toward the
eternal, and (2) the philosophical autarky that renders it monological in na-
ture. Over against these, phron—sis will be shown to be (1) firmly situated in
and directed toward the world of human finitude, and (2) ethically autarkic
and thus dialogical in nature. These two dimensions will be shown to give
phron—sis a capacity for critique unavailable to sophia. By establishing the
second, dialogical dimension of phron—sis, first, I will be able to illustrate how
the constellation of concepts – virtue, habit, ethical intuition, and choice – that
converge in Aristotle’s understanding of phron—sis contributes, contrary to
what some have suggested, to its critical capacities.
2.1. The humanism of phron—sis
Aristotle clearly positions phron—sis below sophia in the hierarchy of know-
ledge because the latter is concerned with things that cannot be other than they
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are and phron—sis is concerned with things human (anthr¸pina) (1141b8–10).
However, from the perspective of the ontological reappropriation of phron—sis
attempted here, this sort of degradation has a positive effect. By designat-
ing human being as the object of phron—sis, Aristotle is forced to take seri-
ously his own injunction to expect only so much precision from a subject as
it will permit (1094b20–7). These lowered expectations of accuracy free Ar-
istotle from his loyalty to the hierarchy of philosophical values and allow
him to develop a form of knowledge radically embedded in the finite world.
With this, of course, comes a level of uncertainty with which philosophers have
traditionally been very uncomfortable.18  One way to understand the impetus
behind the totalizing tendencies of sophia is as the expression of an urgent
desire to minimize uncertainty by maximizing that which is permanent, eter-
nal, secure. By directing his investigation into phron—sis towards the realm
of “things human,” Aristotle turns his eyes away from the blinding light of
eternal certitude towards the refracted world of turbid finitude.
As we have seen, the strategic degradation of the human sphere by which
sophia seeks to secure certainty for itself renders it incapable of critically
reflecting upon the conditions of its own deployment. In turning away from
the world of contingent existence, sophia cuts itself off from those encoun-
ters that can critically challenge the authority of the principles with which it
operates. It is otherwise with phron—sis; for phron—sis never operates in iso-
lation. It is constantly held accountable by the other beings with which it is
always already involved. I will call this inability to operate in isolation the
“dialogical dimension” of phron—sis. It directs phron—sis towards the other and
thus opens up the space for the possibility of critique, for it is in the direct
encounter with the other that the secure hegemony of the same is first called
into question and the ground for critique prepared.
On its face, this insistence upon the dialogical dimension of phron—sis may
appear dissonant with Aristotle’s own explicit claims in the NE. Surely it is
undermined when Aristotle writes: “It seems that phron—sis is most of all
concerned with matters that relate to the person in whom it exists and to him-
self alone” (1141b29–30). At first glance this statement seems to testify only
to the egoism of the phronimos. But its real significance lies in the fact that it
establishes both the self-referential and the self-reflective character of phron—-
sis.19  The self-referential dimension of phron—sis opens up the possibility of
responsibility. By affirming that each act of phronetic judgment is concerned
with and relates to the one doing the judging, Aristotle recognizes that the
phronimos is ineluctably responsible for the judgment itself. The “self-reflec-
tive” dimension of phron—sis suggests that the one who judges must be capa-
ble of reflecting on the various ways in which she or he is always already
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implicated in every act of judgment. This entails an ability not only to criti-
cally consider the concrete historico-ethico-political realities that condition
each judgment, but also to recognize what Richard Bernstein, in interpreting
Gadamer, has called the “enabling prejudices” that always function in human
judgment.20  The recognition that all judgment involves prejudice, both “blind”
and “enabling,” lends urgency to the attempt to develop a kind of knowledge
capable of critically evaluating both the internal and external conditions of
its own deployment. If phron—sis is to be self-critical and self-referential in
the manner suggested, then it cannot be monological.
When taken out of context, sentences like the one cited above seem to
undermine the suggestion that Aristotle himself understood phron—sis as fun-
damentally dialogical; for it cannot be denied that Aristotle never explicitly
thematizes phron—sis as “dialogical.” However, when placed back into the
context of the Ethics as a whole, and specifically, when understood in rela-
tion to the cluster of concepts Aristotle introduces in book VI.11–12, the
dialogical dimension of phron—sis, and with it, the capacity for critique, comes
more clearly into focus.
2.2. The dialogical dimension of phron—sis
In NE VI.11–12, Aristotle establishes the intimate relationship between
phron—sis and what he calls “synesis” (1143a1–b14). For Aristotle, “synesis,”
which literally means a “joining or meeting together” and therefore connotes
a kind of being with others, indicates the peculiar kind of intelligence exhib-
ited by the phronimos. Like phron—sis, synesis is concerned with beings about
which one can raise questions and deliberate (1143a6). However, Aristotle is
clear to establish the difference between phron—sis and synesis, for the latter
remains merely an intellectual capacity to judge, while the former is able to
and must always bridge the gap between theoretical judgment and the action
upon which it is based. Phron—sis is never a purely intellectual exercise, yet
if the intellectual side of phron—sis is permitted to be completely eclipsed, the
misconception emerges that it is merely a matter of mechanical habituation.
As will be seen in the discussion of phron—sis and aret— below, the disposi-
tion of phron—sis is thoroughly saturated by deliberation. Here, however, he
is concerned to establish precisely what sort of intellectual operation is at work
in phron—sis.
In order to do this, however, Aristotle introduces a very revealing analogy.
“Synesis,” he writes, “is neither to have phron—sis nor to acquire it.”
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But just as learning is called intelligent (synienai), whenever it uses scien-
tific knowledge (epist—m—), so too is judging called good (kal¸s) when it
judges by using opinion (doxa) concerning those things with which phron—-
sis is concerned, when someone else speaks (allou legontos) [about them]
(1143a10–15).
The seemingly odd insertion of the genitive absolute, allou legontos, suggests
that synesis is not pursued in isolation, but rather, is situated in concrete,
dialogical encounters with others. Indeed, this passage suggests, as Gadamer
has pointed out, that synesis can be and is deployed in cases in which the
phronimos is not even the one who acts.21  Once synesis is recognized as the
sort of intelligence that is directed toward or exercised in conjunction with
another, a more nuanced and indeed stronger translation of it may be suggested.
The word itself has an etymological relation to “syneid—sis,” or “conscience.”22
Thus, although “syneid—sis” never appears in Aristotle as such, and there re-
mains in the term “conscience” dangerously misleading Christian theologi-
cal and Heideggerian connotations, perhaps we can nonetheless risk the more
bold translation of synesis as “conscientious apprehension” so as to empha-
size the ethical and dialogical connotations it clearly has in Aristotle.23  “Con-
scientious apprehension” names the ability to grasp the nature of a given
situation in a mode of critical self-reflection that remains constantly conscious
of the fact that the judge too is implicated in each act of judgment. The ability
to imagine one’s way into the position of the other and to listen as the other
speaks (allou legontos) are important elements of conscientious apprehension
because they disrupt the internal monologue of the phronimos and direct it
towards that which is outside itself. Here phron—sis is understood as dialogical
not merely because it can listen as others speak, but also because it recog-
nizes that the concrete situation itself is never exclusively determined by
its subjective judgment. Indeed, the fact that synesis must operate with doxa
and not, as sophia, with an immediate grasp of the truth, already suggests
the extent to which phron—sis is itself determined by the world in which it
is embedded.
The embedded nature of phron—sis is further reinforced by a second con-
cept closely connected to synesis: equity or fairness (epieikeia) (1143a20–
33). Aristotle originally introduced the conception of fairness at the end of
his account of justice in NE V because he was concerned to hold the absolute
authority of the law in check. Here epieikeia takes on the meaning of “equity:”
“This is the nature of the equitable: a correction of the law when it errs be-
cause it is stated universally” (1137b26–7). Equity or fairness serves to cor-
rect universal laws that are unable to do justice to the peculiarities of the
individual situation and context to which they are applied. Such laws become
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unjust because they are too rigid and thus require correction by a special de-
cree made in the spirit of fairness. By introducing the notion of fairness into
the structure of phron—sis, Aristotle equips phron—sis with the capacity to criti-
cally question the authority of the universal with which it operates. Here the
dialogical dimension is expressed not in terms of the encounter with another,
but rather as an aspect of the internal operation of phron—sis itself. Epieikeia
points to the capacity of phron—sis to problematize the application of the uni-
versal with which it must operate in each act of judgment so as to ensure that
justice is done in each case. It emerges as an important feature of phron—sis
precisely because Aristotle recognizes that the principles with which the
phronimos operates are never absolute and eternal, but rather, contingent and
fallible.
This recognition of fallibility also drives Aristotle to introduce a third con-
cept closely connected with the two features of conscientious apprehension
and fairness already mentioned: fellow-feeling, leniency or forgiveness
(syngn¸m—). Aristotle claims: “we say the person is fair who is most likely to
forgive, and that fairness is to be forgiving in specific cases” (1143a21–2).
Here forgiveness clearly operates with fairness so as to ensure justice in each
specific case. By emphasizing not only fairness, but also forgiveness or leni-
ency, Aristotle further equips phron—sis with the capacity to recognize the po-
tential fallibility of its own operation. Such a recognition would be absurd for
sophia, for it concerns only those beings that cannot be otherwise. The de-
ployment of sophia, with its capacity through theoretical nous to immediately
apprehend the truth, is thought infallible. Where one cannot be wrong, there
is no need for forgiveness. Forgiveness emerges as a fundamental feature of
phron—sis precisely because it is embedded in doxa and concerned with those
beings that can be otherwise. By emphasizing this capacity to forgive, Aris-
totle further reinforces the dialogical dimension of phron—sis, for as Hannah
Arendt has suggested, “no one can forgive himself” as forgiving in solitude
and isolation remains “without reality and can signify no more than a role
played before one’s self.”24  As elements of the dialogical dimension of phron—-
sis, conscientious apprehension, fairness and forgiveness shatter this sort of
delusional self-indulgence and equip phron—sis with a self-reflectiveness una-
vailable to sophia.
By emphasizing these elements of the dialogical dimension of Aristotle’s
conception of phron—sis and insisting that they equip phron—sis with a criti-
cal capacity unavailable to sophia, I remain loyal to the spirit of the NE in its
attempt to do justice to the contingency of human existence. However, it may
be argued that, when understood in relation to what Aristotle says about the
nature of ethical virtue, habit and choice, severe limits are in fact placed on
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the critical capacities of the phronimos.25  Yet when the discussion of phron—sis
is situated back into the context of the constellation of concepts that deter-
mine it in the Ethics, its critical capacities, far from being limited, are in fact
deepened and expanded. In order to appreciate this, however, we must attend
to the internal operation of phron—sis, and specifically to the respective roles
virtue, habit, ethical intuition and choice play in it.
2.3. Phron—sis situated
The discussion of conscientious apprehension, fairness and forgiveness already
directs us toward the peculiar place in which phron—sis is situated: the con-
crete encounter with the individual. Aristotle insists that phron—sis must be
directed toward the individual with which it is concerned: “It is not possible
for phron—sis to be knowledge of the universal (kath’ holou) alone, it must
also know the individuals (ta kath, hekasta); for it is practical, and action con-
cerns individuals” (1141b15–18). Aristotle’s affirmation of the individual here
is not an absolute rejection of the universal; phron—sis must operate with
universals.26  Rather, Aristotle recognizes that true phronetic judgment is
always situated precisely between the universal and the individual, that, to
borrow from Kant, universals without individuals are empty, individuals
without universals, blind. This was the impetus behind Gadamer’s appropria-
tion of phron—sis as a model for hermeneutics. He too recognized that in the
application (Anwendung) of phron—sis the universal and the individual are
co-determined (WM, 328/322).27  This dynamic co-determination of the uni-
versal and the individual decisively differentiates phron—sis from sophia.
The logic at work in sophia is driven by the absolute authority of the eter-
nal first principles. As we have seen, Aristotle calls the knowledge of such
principles “universal” not because they are thematized as highest genera un-
der which all beings are subsumed, but because such knowledge is capable of
knowing all things without attending to each individually. This dimension of
sophia seems to distinguish it even from epist—m—, for Aristotle suggests at
the end of the Posterior Analytics, that epist—m— establishes the “first univer-
sal in the soul” by induction and thus that epistemic universals, in some sense
at least, are dependent upon the direct encounter with individuals through the
power of sensation (100a16–b7). If, however, epist—m— seeks eternal certainty,
and if sophia, by means of its noetic power, convinces itself that it has suc-
ceeded in this quest, phron—sis is so thoroughly embedded in the world of fi-
nite contingency that it no longer permits itself to be seduced by the quest for
certainty. Phron—sis disrupts the philosophical obsession with certainty and
49THE ONTOLOGICAL REAPPROPRIATION OF PHRON7SIS
redirects itself toward the concrete individual from which the possibility of
genuine critique first emerges.
2.4. Virtue
There is no phron—sis without virtue (aret—) (1144b31–2). Virtue determines
the end of action towards which phron—sis is directed (1145a3–5). It is tempt-
ing to understand this statement in terms of the logic of technical production
according to which phron—sis would be concerned merely with the means to
establish some end determined externally by virtue. Aristotle himself seems
to have originally developed the relationship between deliberation and ends
in book III along these lines: “We deliberate not concerning the ends, but
concerning the things towards the ends (peri t¸n pros ta tel—)” (1112b11–12).
However, once Aristotle establishes the distinction between poi—sis and praxis
(1140b4–7), it is no longer possible to understand phron—sis according to the
logic of production; for the end of praxis is not, like that of poi—sis, determined
from the outside.28  Aristotle’s ultimate identification of phron—sis with aret—
is necessitated by the fact that phron—sis concerns praxis which is an end in
itself; as such, phron—sis must be concerned not only with the means to ends,
but also with the determination of the ends themselves.
The misinterpretation that reads phron—sis as merely concerned with the
means towards the ends established by ethical aret— is the result of a twofold
misunderstanding. First, it results from a tendency – operating throughout
Aristotle, despite himself – to understand activities in terms of the means-ends
logic of production. That praxis and by extension phron—sis cannot be cap-
tured by this logic is clear once Aristotle establishes the distinction between
poi—sis and praxis. Second, as Richard Sorabji has suggested, Aristotle’s ten-
dency to treat the different aspects of his ethical theory separately leads to
a false impression of the theory as a whole.29  This is particularly acute in
the case of the relation between phron—sis and ethical aret—; for by present-
ing them in isolation from one another, Aristotle gives the impression that
they are really separated – the one determining the means, the other the ends.
By calling phron—sis itself an aret— (1140b224–5), Aristotle corrects this mis-
conception and implicitly grants phron—sis the capacity to determine the ends
themselves.30  When seen in its intimate connection with aret—, phron—sis
must be recognized as self-sufficient, but ethically so, for the ends are largely
determined by the context in which the phronimos is embedded.
Insofar as phron—sis is an aret— and therefore capable of determining the
ends themselves, the difference between it and techn— echoes that between
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sophia and epist—m—; for as sophia must not merely understand the things that
follow from the principles, but also possess the truth concerning the princi-
ples, so too must phron—sis not merely determine itself towards the ends, but
as aret— it also must determine the ends themselves as good (1144b25–27).
However, whereas sophia knows the truth about the principles immediately
by a pure exercise of nous, phron—sis must rely on virtue which arises out of
lived experience. Virtue is determined by the cultural, political and historical
context in which it is embedded. This sort of situated empiricism disrupts what
may be called a “logic of domination” that operates in Aristotle’s other forms
of knowledge. It undermines the hegemony of the subject at work in techn—,
where the end is pre-determined by the artist and imposed upon the matter
from without. It undermines the totalizing function of epist—m—, where indi-
viduals are subsumed under fixed universal principles.31  Finally, it undermines
the impetuous tyranny of sophia, where the eternally true principles are im-
mediately intuited by nous and deployed without any need to attend to each
case individually. Phron—sis, however, permits no such self-indulgence. The
presence of the individual is the very condition for the possibility of its own
operation. Ironically, however, what actualizes this encounter with the indi-
vidual is itself called “nous.”
2.5. Ethical nous
Because phron—sis is concerned with the ultimate individual and includes logos,
it seems at first glance diametrically opposed to nous, for as Aristotle says:
On the one hand, nous is of definitions, of which there is no reasoning
(logos), phron—sis is, on the other hand, of the ultimate individual, of which
there is not epist—m—, but rather sensation, not the sensation of the proper
sensibles, but the sort by which we sense that the ultimate individual [in
mathematics] is the triangle. For here too [mathematics] will stand [before
the individual]. But this is more properly sensation than phron—sis, of that,
however, there is another kind (1142a25–30).
This rather cryptic suggestion points to the possibility that there is a sort of
sensation at work in phron—sis that plays a role similar to that of nous in
sophia.32  For just as sophia intuits the truth through a direct encounter with
the eternal first principles, so too does phron—sis sense the truth through a di-
rect encounter with the individual. Insofar as it determines the truth through
direct encounter, this sensation of another kind functions in phron—sis very
much like nous in sophia.
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This analogy breaks down, however, when the main point of the above
passage is considered. There Aristotle is concerned to delineate the difference
between epistemic and phronetic sensation. The former must make a stand
before the individual triangle only in order to be able to recognize it as a
member of the class of beings determined by the definition with which it
operates. Its nous is of the definition, which is eternal. The sensation involved
in phron—sis is not categorical in this sense, for it requires both virtue and de-
liberation. Thus, unlike the nous of sophia, the sensation of phron—sis is never
immediate, for it is always mediated by virtue, which is informed by lived
experience, and deliberation, which takes time.33  The sensation of phron—sis,
is like a kind of nous insofar as it is direct, but it is unlike philosophical nous
insofar as it is, on one hand, unavoidably embedded in and constantly medi-
ated by the context in which it is deployed, and, on the other hand, completely
dependent on the actual presence of the individual. The recognition that the
operation of phron—sis is always mediated by the concrete ethico-historico con-
ditions in which it is embedded is the impetus behind Aristotle’s claims that
phron—sis does not exist without logos. This specifically logical dimension
of phron—sis is developed in Aristotle’s discussion of deliberation, habit and
choice to which we must now turn.
2.6. Deliberation, habit and choice
Deliberation and choice are treated here together with habit in order to coun-
teract the misimpression – exacerbated by Aristotle’s own decision to discuss
the moral virtues in isolation from the so-called intellectual virtues in NE II.1
– that habit is non-intellectual. Richard Sorabji has effectively argued against
this misconception, suggesting that habituation “is not a mindless process . . .
habituation involves assessing the situation and seeing what is called for. So
habituation is intimately linked with the kind of intuitive perception (nous)
that we have been discussing.”34  This fits in well with the picture of phron—sis
as an aret— presented above; for knowing the right thing in a given context
requires both experience and habituation – one must be well practiced in
making good judgments and disposed to do so. But Aristotle nowhere states
that habit alone is sufficient for virtue, rather, such a view would undermine
not only the importance of ethical intuition and thus the centrality of the ac-
tual encounter on which all human action is based, but also, it would divorce
habit from deliberation, thus severing virtue from logos. To cut virtue off from
logos in this way would be to eliminate the possibility of responsibility, a pos-
sibility Aristotle clearly wants to insist upon in his conception of virtue. In-
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deed, he defines virtue this way: “Virtue, then, is a disposition toward delib-
erate choice (hexis prohairetik—), being at a mean relative to us, having been
defined by logos and in a manner in which the phronimos would define it”
(1106b36–1107a2). As a disposition towards deliberate choice, virtue can never
become rote habit.35
Deliberation and choice are of decisive importance for virtue and thus for
phron—sis precisely because they are bound up with logos and thus are firmly
situated in the finite field of human being. If practical nous orients the
phronimos toward the direct encounter with the individual, deliberation and
choice secure for the phronimos the capacity to critically consider that which
it confronts. Deliberation (to bouleuesthai) is inherently self-reflexive. This
is implicitly heard in the Greek word itself, which is derived from bouleuein,
“to take council, consider,” but which Aristotle repeatedly uses throughout the
Ethics in the middle voice, thus giving it the self-reflexive meaning: “to take
council with oneself.” By intimately linking phron—sis to this self-reflexive
meaning of “to bouleuesthai” (1141b8–14), Aristotle implicitly recognizes
that the phronimos is always implicated in each act of judgment. This shatters
the delusion of the absolute authority of the phronimos and infuses phron—sis
with a dimension of responsibility that sophia cannot have. Sophia does not
deliberate. Its direct intuition of the absolute, eternal truth is at once its im-
mediate judgment according to this truth.
Deliberation, on the contrary, is bound up with finite temporality; like
phron—sis, it too concerns those beings that can be other than they are
(1112a22). The truth of such beings is not the eternal truth of sophia, but rather,
the murky truth of finite existence. Thus, Aristotle tells us, “those who delib-
erate take much time” (1142b3–4). Because there is an inherent dimension of
uncertainty embedded in phron—sis, because phron—sis takes human finitude
seriously, deliberation is required to negotiate the encounter between the
judging subject and that which is judged in each new situation. This takes
time precisely because the right choice (prohairesis orth—) must be deter-
mined by considering the contingencies of the context, historical experience
and the idiosyncrasies of the individuals involved. Aristotle himself hints at
the sort of temporality involved here when he links deliberation to prohairesis,
choice (1113a3–13), and suggests that the name “prohairesis” itself points to
a sort of “taking” of one thing “before” other things (NE 1112a15–18, cf. EE
1226b5–9). Here Aristotle recognizes that deliberation is embedded in the very
succession of finite time.36  The discursive nature of deliberation, however,
does not have the structure of motion that determined Aristotle’s investiga-
tion of time in the Physics.37  Rather, it is the ecstatic temporality of finite
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human being according to which each new present is both informed by the
past and directed toward the future.
The historical dimension of phron—sis is captured by its characterizations
as both an aret— and a hexis.  Ethical virtues only arise out of that extensive
field of lived experience upon which the phronimos must draw in order to
determine the right end, and habits are determined by the cultural and histori-
cal context into which the phronimos is born. The analogue to these dimen-
sions of phron—sis is perhaps the “enabling prejudice” that Gadamer recognized
as a condition for all judgment; for judgment does not occur in a vacuum. The
futural dimension of phron—sis is captured in the notion of prohairesis itself;
for prohairesis is precisely directed towards the end (pros to telos).38  How-
ever, insofar as it is a dimension of phron—sis, prohairesis must operate with
conscientious apprehension, fairness and forgiveness – it can never be the mere
imposition of the arbitrary ends of the subject. This suggests the importance
of the fact that these two ecstasies of the temporality of phron—sis are brought
together by and held accountable to the direct encounter with the individual.
This encounter, grounded in logos but made possible by ethical nous, is the
core of phron—sis, the starting point (arch—) and the last ultimate (to eschaton)
towards which it must be directed. In the end, it is this encounter, direct, yet
always mediated by the nexus of historico-ethico-politico relations, that se-
cures the critical capacities of phron—sis.
It may, of course, be objected that Aristotle himself was too caught up in
the prejudices of Greek culture to develop such a radically critical concep-
tion of phron—sis, that indeed, he was, in the end, intent on placing strict lim-
its on the critical capacities of phron—sis in order to secure the hegemony of
a very determinate vision of the good life based on the dominant values of
classical Greek culture.39 Such a position, however, fails to recognize three
important points. First, as Ross has pointed out, Aristotle “nowhere attempts
to deduce the necessity of any single virtue from the supreme end to be
attained.”40 In other words, nowhere is Aristotle dogmatic about the virtues;
rather, he speaks of the ethical virtues as examples to illustrate how to aim at
the mean in a given situation.41 He never offers an exclusive or exhaustive
taxonomy of virtues. Precisely what is noble in a given context is a matter for
the practically wise person, embedded in a culture and situated at a given point
in history, to determine. To argue that Aristotle is dogmatic about the virtuous
life is to fail to recognize Aristotle’s intense dedication to do justice to the con-
crete contingency of human existence. The second point such objections fail
to recognize is that Aristotle’s conception of phron—sis is not caught inescap-
ably in the instrumental logic of means-ends determinations. If Aristotle some-
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times emphasizes the fact that phron—sis is directed towards the end and does
not determine the ends themselves, it is probably, as Gadamer has suggested,
in order to contrast his position which emphasizes the primacy of action, with
the Platonic position that virtue is a state of the soul.42 However, to suggest
that phron—sis is limited to considering means and never ends is to downplay
the difference between phron—sis and techn— and to fail to appreciate the im-
portance of Aristotle’s insistence that phron—sis is itself a virtue (1140b24–
5). Finally, such objections refuse to read Aristotle through any lens other than
that determined by the ideals of sophia. Reading through the lens of sophia
forces one to assume that Aristotle here too seeks to secure absolute certainty
and so turns dogmatic about the true meaning of the good life. What such read-
ings fail appreciate is the extent to which phron—sis challenges the authority
of the very lens according to which sophia determines that which it encoun-
ters.
3. The ontological reappropriation of phron—sis
The notion of phron—sis in Aristotle emerges as a genuine challenge to the
normative assumptions endemic to the attempt to elevate sophia. Where sophia
seeks divine eternity, phron—sis settles into human finitude; where sophia posits
the absolute authority of its first principles and determines beings without re-
quiring their direct presence, phron—sis identifies the concrete encounter with
the other as the ultimate ground for the legitimacy of its principles; where
sophia demeans inter-dependence as a sign of weakness, phron—sis affirms
its fundamental significance as a determining condition of all judgment. In
short, where sophia posits the ultimate foundation of order, phron—sis recog-
nizes that truth must always be critically engaged, for it does not lie in ulti-
mates but rather in the give and take between actually existing beings.
These are precisely the dimensions of phron—sis I would like to reappro-
priate for ontology. To reappropriate phron—sis in this way is, of course, to
move beyond anything Aristotle himself actually argued. Yet, it is in no way
to violate the spirit of Aristotelian thinking; for not only does Aristotle equip
phron—sis with the critical capacities outlined above, but also, his own rela-
tionship to his predecessors is often marked by a similar sort of appropria-
tion. As Aristotle thinks along with and beyond Parmenides, Empedocles
and particularly Plato, so too does he encourage us to think along with and to
move beyond his own thinking. Thus, it is possible to follow the trace of an
idea in Aristotle which itself is never fully developed. The ontological sig-
nificance of phron—sis is precisely such a trace.
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An ontology directed by phron—sis rather than sophia, would be one that
recognizes itself as inherently ethical. It would therefore consider it a part of
its duty to question the normative values with which it operates. It would not
seek refuge in the realm of the eternal, but would recognize its own inherent
embeddedness in the world and would thus be capable of critically consider-
ing the historico-ethico-political conditions under which it is deployed. It
would recognize that there is an element of violence in every act of judgment
and it would actively work to minimize this violence by attending to the con-
crete otherness of the being with which it is concerned. It would recognize
this encounter with the other as the site from which critique first becomes
possible and to which it must remain ultimately responsible. Its goal would
not be the eternal truth that arises directly out of the immediate vision of su-
preme, permanent principles, but the finite truth that emerges out the medi-
ated encounters between existing beings. It would resist every temptation to
annihilate the uncertainty endemic to this kind of truth, but would assiduously
seek the truth in each new encounter. It would be, in short, an ontology no
longer perverted by its love of sophia.
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